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The Right to Remain Silent in Light of the 
War on Terror 
Ronald J. Rychlak* 
“The law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument 
of his own conviction.” 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (quoting 2 William 
Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 46 § 34 (8th ed. 
1824)). 
 
“[T]he ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but 
an unmitigated good . . . . Admissions of guilt resulting from valid 
Miranda waivers ‘are more than merely “desirable”; they are essential 
to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing 
those who violate the law.’” 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (quoting Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)). 
INTRODUCTION 
The familiar words of the Miranda warning are known by 
almost all Americans who have watched television at any time 
since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Miranda v. Ari-
zona.1  The precise rules have evolved over the years, but most 
people know that they have the right to remain silent and the 
right to have an attorney appointed if they cannot afford one.  
There can be difficult issues of proof in court, but litigants, attor-
neys, and judges fundamentally know how Miranda works.2  
That is not to say, however, that Miranda is uncontroversial.  
Few areas of law provoke more consistent debate than interroga-
tion and confessions,3 and Miranda’s exclusion of incriminating 
 
 * MDLA Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of 
Mississippi School of Law.  The author would like to thank the Chapman Law Review, 
Chapman University, and the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law at the 
University of Mississippi School of Law for support in researching this topic. 
 1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 If a suspect is interrogated while in custody, the officer has to inform the suspect 
of his or her rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present for questioning, and 
the suspect must waive those rights or statements made by the suspect will be inadmissi-
ble at trial.  Id. at 444–45. 
 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 291 (2d ed. Horn-
book Series 1992). 
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statements in some criminal cases has only added to the contro-
versy.  Moreover, the events of September 11, 2001 and the sub-
sequent War on Terror have renewed interest in the issue of in-
terrogation and confessions.  The stakes have gotten higher.4 
The dilemma most often presented is the “ticking bomb” sce-
nario.  This is the situation in which the authorities want to in-
terrogate a suspect who is in custody regarding his knowledge 
about a ticking bomb or a planned terrorist attack.5  Is this sus-
pect entitled not to incriminate himself?  What about the right to 
have an attorney present, or the right to remain silent?  The re-
sponses to these questions might seem obvious to many people: 
an emphatic “no and no.”6  In reality, of course, the more likely 
scenario is one in which several suspects are in custody, and one 
or more of them may have knowledge relevant to a planned ter-
rorist attack but many others will have no such knowledge.  
What rights are to be accorded the suspects in that situation? 
To properly address this issue, one must resolve several pre-
liminary questions, including: Do standard criminal procedure 
laws apply?  Where are the suspects being held (inside or outside 
of the United States)?  What is their citizenship status?  How ur-
gent is the supposed threat?  How reliable is the information 
known by the authorities?  Can torture ever be justified, and how 
is it defined?  What about psychological pressure?  What is the 
consequence of violating the rights of the detainee/prisoner?  
What international obligations apply?7  Many of these questions 
 
 4 “[C]laims of violations of human-rights law or the Constitution must be evaluated 
in the context of the realities created by Sept. 11.”  John C. Yoo, Perspectives on the Rules 
of War: Sept. 11 Has Changed the Rules, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2004, at B9.  See also 
M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 
12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003) (proposing a “foreign interrogation” exception to 
Miranda). 
 5 See George J. Terwillinger III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal to 
Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55, 55 (setting forth a similar 
scenario). 
 6 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
152 (2006) (“The Fifth Amendment’s right to remain silent . . . applies only in the criminal 
justice system.”).  Yoo details the problems of providing similar rights to terrorist sus-
pects.  Id. at 152–53.  But see United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (holding that FBI agents sent to Afghanistan to interrogate captured members of 
the al Qaeda network had to abide by constitutional limitations).  The Court stated, “The 
Supreme Court cases on point suggest that the Fourth Amendment applies to United 
States citizens abroad. . . . Thus, this Court finds that even though the searches at issue 
in this case occurred in Kenya, El-Hage can bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.”  Id. at 
270–71. 
 7 See James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals?  The Impact of 
Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on State Govern-
ments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 997 (1998).  In 
early 2007, German prosecutors indicted several CIA agents for allegedly capturing a 
German citizen, taking him to a third country, and subjecting him to harsh interrogation.  
Mark Landler, German Court Challenges C.I.A. over Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, 
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go beyond the scope of this article, but as this Symposium re-
veals, the rights of terrorist suspects and the potential applicabil-
ity of Miranda are much more than hypothetical questions.  Gov-
ernmental sources, academic commentators, and the media have 
all recently devoted a great deal of attention to these subjects.8  
As the United States continues to fight the War on Terror and 
seek out terrorist activity located outside of this nation, interro-
gations of non-American citizens by American officials will un-
doubtedly increase both in number and importance. 
Certainly an American citizen arrested within the United 
States would have the right not to incriminate himself.  Pre-
sumably a foreign national arrested outside of the United States 
would not be fully protected.9  Other scenarios present more diffi-
cult issues.10  American courts, therefore, have to determine 
whether the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination applies to non-American citizens, and whether an 
American police or military agent conducting an investigation 
abroad must provide some type of warnings before conducting an 
interrogation.11  The initial question would seem to be whether 
terrorist suspects are even entitled to the right protected by 
Miranda—the right not to incriminate themselves. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The problems with permitting suspects to testify against 
 
at A1. 
 8 See Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A Criti-
cal Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal For a New Miranda Exception 
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002); Robert L. Bartley, A ‘Miranda’ Warning for Saddam? 
Democrats Try to Discredit America’s Victory, OPINIONJOURNAL.COM, July 14, 2003, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110003743; Andrew C. 
McCarthy, McCain & Miranda: “Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading” May Prove More Dan-
gerous than Meets the Eye, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Dec. 15, 2005, 
http://www.nationalreview.com (follow “Search” hyperlink; then follow “National Review 
Online” hyperlink; then search “more dangerous than meets the eye”). 
 9 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (“[T]he same rule of interpre-
tation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically de-
pendent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the 
right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpe-
trated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.”).  But see Bin 
Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (“The Government seems to concede the general applicabil-
ity of the Fourth Amendment to American citizens abroad . . . .”). 
 10 When Congress focuses a statute on extraterritorial conduct or provides an ex-
plicit extraterritorial provision in the statute, it is clear that there is a basis for prosecut-
ing extraterritorial activities.  See generally Ellen S. Podgor, “Defensive Territoriality”: A 
New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1 (2002). 
 11 Complicating these questions is the fact that the laws of many foreign nations do 
not provide suspects with the full range of rights embodied in Miranda, such as the right 
to remain silent or the right to speak to an attorney.  Thus, informing a foreign national 
of these rights might actually mislead the suspect, at least as to any prosecution that 
might take place in that nation.  Godsey, supra note 8, at 1708. 
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themselves (which often leads to suspects being forced to testify 
against themselves) have long been recognized.  As early as 866, 
Pope St. Nicholas I wrote: 
  If a [putative] thief or bandit is apprehended and denies the 
charges against him, you tell me your custom is for a judge to beat 
him with blows to the head and tear the sides of his body with other 
sharp iron goads until he confesses the truth.  Such a procedure is to-
tally unacceptable under both divine and human law . . . , since a con-
fession should be spontaneous, not forced.  It should be proffered vol-
untarily, not violently extorted.  After all, if it should happen that 
even after inflicting all these torments, you still fail to wrest from the 
sufferer any self-incrimination regarding the crime of which he is ac-
cused, will you not then at least blush for shame and acknowledge 
how impious is your judicial procedure?  Likewise, suppose an accused 
man is unable to endure such torments and so confesses to a crime he 
never committed.  Upon whom, pray tell, will now devolve the full 
brunt of responsibility for such an enormity, if not upon him who co-
erced the accused into confessing such lies about himself?12 
One way to avoid these problems is to provide suspects with 
the right to remain silent.  For at least 400 years, Great Britain 
has extended the privilege against self-incrimination to criminal 
suspects,13 and scholars have been debating the merits of that 
privilege all along.14 
Police and prosecuting authorities consider confessions to be 
not only persuasive (and in some cases conclusive) of guilt, but 
also absolutely necessary for the smooth functioning of the crimi-
nal legal system.  Suspects, however, do not typically confess to 
civil authorities to cleanse their souls.  As one author put it, “by 
any standards of human discourse, a criminal confession can 
never truly be called voluntary.  With rare exception, a confes-
sion is compelled, provoked and manipulated from a suspect by a 
 
 12 Brian W. Harrison, The Church and Torture, THIS ROCK, Dec. 2006, at 23, 25 
(quoting Pope Nicholas I, Ad Consulta Vestra ch. 86 (Nov. 13, 866)) (first alteration in 
original).  Nicholas went on to suggest a different approach based on scripture (Hebrews 
6:16), which involved making the person swear innocence on the Holy Gospel and accept-
ing his word at that point.  Pope Nicholas I, Ad Consulta Vestra ch. 86 (Nov. 13, 866), 
available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/866nicholas-bulgar.html. 
 13 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 42–43 (2d ed. 1958) (describing the 1568 Court of Common Pleas’ release 
of a defendant imprisoned for not answering the judge’s questions). 
 14 See, e.g., id. at 48–58 (summarizing criticism of the privilege by Jeremy Bentham, 
among others); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY 
APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 229–41 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827) (criticizing 
the exclusion of self-incriminating evidence because the innocent would want to speak, 
and therefore the privilege would only protect the guilty); Ian Dennis, Instrumental Pro-
tection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the Privilege against Self-
Incrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342, 342–53 (1995) (concluding that the system should 
apply the privilege in limited contexts and not view it as a human right); David Dolinko, 
Is There a Rationale for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 
1064 (1986) (describing the privilege as a historical relic). 
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detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful art.”15  
Investigators throughout history have resorted to tactics, some of 
them unsavory, to encourage statements from suspects.16  The 
Miranda rules are designed to regulate police interrogations by 
requiring them to inform suspects of their legal rights and by 
suppressing statements that are taken in violation of those 
rights. 
In the days of the Star Chamber, procedures such as the rack 
and other instruments of torture were used to obtain confessions.  
Concern over the harsh tactics to compel statements from prison-
ers gradually resulted in the development of the right to remain 
silent.17  In fact, because of the force that was being used to com-
pel confessions, Great Britain eventually prohibited all parties, 
including criminal defendants, from testifying as witnesses at 
their trials.18 
A complete ban on all testimony from parties was eventually 
recognized as an obstacle in the pursuit of truth, and the prohibi-
tion was lifted.19  Criminal defendants were permitted to testify, 
but they also had the right not to testify.20  Judges, however, 
could comment on a defendant’s failure to testify.21 
Following English common law, early American courts per-
mitted the introduction of confessions without restriction, even if 
law enforcement officials abridged the rights of those being inter-
 
 15 DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199 (1991). 
 16 In The Proof of Guilt, Glanville Williams describes procedures such as the rack 
and other instruments of torture used to obtain confessions “in the bad old days” of the 
Star Chamber.  WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 38–41. 
 17 See WILLIAMS, supra note 13 (describing the development of the privilege over 
hundreds of years).  Some historians date the beginning of the concept of a privilege to 
1637, with John Lilburn, a Star Chamber case.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
459 (1966) (identifying Lilburn as a critical historical event in the development of the 
privilege).  Parliament abolished the Star Chamber after this trial.  See id. (noting the 
Star Chamber’s fall following the Lilburn trial).  Other scholars trace the privilege even 
further back in time.  See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 244 n.2 
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting the view that the privilege dates back to 
canon law); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458–59 n.27 (noting that some commentators find 
analogous principles in the Bible). 
 18 Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 485–90 (1939).  
See also WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 43 (describing procedures regarding the defendant 
as a witness in the 1700s). 
 19 The House of Commons passed the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.  See WILLIAMS, 
supra note 13, at 45–48 (noting that the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 was developed to 
counteract unmerited acquittals resulting from defendants not testifying); see also Crimi-
nal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36 (Eng.) (changing rules regarding the compe-
tency of witnesses). 
 20 See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1(a) (Eng.) (stating that a 
charged person “shall be a competent witness,” but “shall [only] be called . . . upon his own 
application”). 
 21 See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 59–61.  In addition, once a defendant elected to 
testify, the Act compelled him to answer incriminating questions.  Id. 
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rogated.22  The key issue was whether the confession was reli-
able.23  Too often, forcibly extracted confessions were given by the 
suspects solely to stop the interrogation.24  This focus on reliabil-
ity dominated American confession law well into the twentieth 
century.25 
In the 1944 case Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court 
discussed aggressive interrogation methods known as the “third 
degree.”26  These techniques were designed to force confessions 
without brutal force, but with tactics such as powerful lights, 
persistent questioning over numerous hours, and deprivation of 
sleep.27  The Court held that where the manner of interrogation 
was “inherently coercive,” the confession would be inadmissible 
regardless of reliability.28  Importantly, if impermissible methods 
were used, a confession would be inadmissible regardless of the 
impact that the methods had on that particular defendant.29 
The problem with the “voluntariness test” was that virtually 
all confessions are “involuntary” to some extent.  As one author 
put it, “[B]y any standards of human discourse, a criminal con-
fession can never truly be called voluntary.  With rare exception, 
a confession is compelled, provoked and manipulated from a sus-
pect by a detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful 
 
 22 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 294. 
 23 See id. (“[T]he question was put in terms of whether the defendant’s confession 
had been induced by a promise of benefit or threat of harm, while on other occasions the 
inquiry was more directly put in terms of whether the circumstances under which the de-
fendant had spoken impaired the reliability of the confession.”). 
 24 The actual number of false confessions is unknown and probably unknowable.  It 
is certainly subject to debate.  Compare Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An 
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 529 (1999) (stating that “false confessions occur quite infrequently”), 
with Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depriva-
tions of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430 (1998) (arguing that false confessions are much more 
common). 
 25 Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal 
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 494; see also Joseph D. 
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 
(1979).  Military commissions still look to see whether information is relevant and reliable 
in order to decide issues of admissibility.  YOO, supra note 6, at 218–19. 
 26 322 U.S. 143, 150–52 (1944). 
 27 Id. at 150 & n.6.  The Court found Ashcraft’s confession involuntary, compelled, 
and thus inadmissible.  Id. at 153.  This conclusion was based on the officers’ continual 
relay-style interrogation over a period of thirty-six hours without rest.  Id. 
 28 Id. at 154.  See also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949) (citing Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1941)) (noting that if circumstances indicate that the 
confession was not given by the free will of the defendant, it will not be deemed voluntary 
and therefore will be inadmissible, even though the statements may be reliable). 
 29 Ashcraft, 332 U.S. at 160.  The Court has noted, however, that the characteristics 
of a particular defendant might subject him or her to particular peril.  See Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[M]ental condition is surely relevant to an individ-
ual’s susceptibility to police coercion.”). 
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art.”30  Critics also argued that the voluntariness test permitted 
too much pressure to be applied on suspects, as it only prohibited 
prosecutors from using evidence obtained by “interrogation 
methods that would exert so much pressure that the suspect 
would admit to facts regardless of whether she believed in the 
truth of the facts admitted.”31  Nevertheless, the voluntariness 
rule survives even today,32 though it is often overshadowed by 
Miranda. 
In the late 1950s, the Supreme Court put in place the so-
called McNabb-Mallory rule.33  Based on a federal statute34 and 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,35 this rule held that a 
criminal defendant had to be arraigned “without unnecessary de-
lay” and that any confession obtained during such a delay could 
be excluded from evidence in any subsequent prosecution.36  This 
rule was never constitutionally required, and it was eventually 
supplanted by Miranda.37 
In the 1960s, the Warren Court dramatically reshaped the 
way society dealt with criminals and criminal suspects.  Prior to 
that time, protections afforded defendants in state criminal pro-
ceedings (where most criminal cases are tried) were often quite 
limited.  The Bill of Rights applied only to the federal govern-
 
 30 SIMON, supra note 15, at 199.  On the other hand, recent studies suggest that 
about 20% of the confessions obtained by the police would have been made even if there 
had been no interrogation.  Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: Encour-
aging Reliable Confessions while Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 56 
(2006). 
 31 Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 
2001, 2012 (1998). 
 32 In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), a man “heard voices” that com-
manded him to do things.  One of those things was to make a confession.  Id. at 161.  
Lower courts, based on testimony from psychologists, concluded that this was not volun-
tary and therefore was inadmissible.  Id. at 161–62.  The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that before a confession could be deemed involuntary, there must be “coercive police 
activity.”  Since there was none here, it was not involuntary.  Id. at 167. 
 33 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341–42, 345 (1943); Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957). 
 34 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940) (“It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other 
officer, who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offense, to take the defendant 
before the nearest United States commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having juris-
diction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial . . . .”). 
 35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
 36  See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341–42, 345; Mallory, 354 U.S. at 451, 453.  See also 
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 354 (1994) (“The so-called McNabb-
Mallory rule . . . generally rendered inadmissible confessions made during periods of de-
tention that violated the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Rule 5(a) provides that a person arrested for a federal of-
fense shall be taken ‘without unnecessary delay’ before the nearest federal magistrate, or 
before a state or local judicial officer authorized to set bail for federal offenses under 18 
U.S.C. § 3041, for a first appearance, or presentment.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 37 The Miranda opinion noted both the history of the “third degree” and the danger 
of false confessions.  It described the modern interrogation process as “psychologically 
rather than physically oriented.”  Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 445–48 (1966).  
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ment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which did apply to the 
states, gave criminal defendants only those fundamental rights 
deemed “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”38  In the 
1960s, the Supreme Court began to read the Fourteenth 
Amendment in a new manner.  Instead of looking for fundamen-
tal rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, it moved to 
“selective incorporation” of provisions contained in the Bill of 
Rights.39  By moving to this approach, the Supreme Court led a 
revolution in American criminal procedure and provided all of 
the following rights to state criminal defendants: the freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures and the exclusionary 
rule;40 the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;41 
the right to assistance of counsel in felony cases;42 the privilege 
against self-incrimination;43 the right to confront opposing wit-
nesses;44 the right to a speedy trial;45 the right to compel defense 
witnesses to appear at trial;46 the right to a jury trial;47 and pro-
tection against double jeopardy.48  In 1972, the death penalty was 
declared unconstitutional as it was then applied,49 and in 1973, 
states were prohibited from outlawing abortions in the early 
stages of pregnancy.50 
Regarding interrogations and confessions, the Supreme 
Court first adopted a rule based upon the Sixth Amendment.51  
Massiah v. United States prohibited the police from “deliberately 
eliciting” statements from an individual after the initiation of ju-
dicial proceedings (indictment, information, arraignment, or pre-
liminary hearing) without an attorney being present.52  The fol-
lowing month, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court created the 
“focus” test, enforcing the right to counsel at the point when an 
investigation focuses on the accused with the purpose of eliciting 
 
 38 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–28 (1937). 
 39 The selective incorporation doctrine was established by Justice Reed in Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51–54 (1947). 
 40 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 41 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 42 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
 43 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
 44 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
 45 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967). 
 46 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967). 
 47 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 48 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). 
 49 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
 50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).  See also Ronald J. Rychlak, Abortion, 
Thinking Americans, and Judicial Politics, 14 LIFE AND LEARNING 77, 85–86 (2004). 
 51 Until 1964, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states.  
See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
 52 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).  This test remains valid even after Miranda.  See, e.g., 
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523–24 (2004). 
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a confession.53  The next year, the Court switched to a Fifth 
Amendment analysis and set forth the now-familiar Miranda 
rules. 
II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
The Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being 
“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.”54  In the 1966 case Miranda v. Arizona,55 the Court held 
that certain procedural rights had to be afforded to suspects in a 
custodial interrogation context in order to safeguard Fifth 
Amendment rights.56  The Court examined the facts of four dif-
ferent cases collectively and developed not one holding but what 
some call “a complex series of holdings.”57  A confession by a sus-
pect in a custodial setting, even though voluntarily made, would 
be inadmissible unless, preceding the confession, the suspect was 
given four warnings: (1) that he had the right to remain silent, 
(2) that any statement could be used against him, (3) that he had 
the right to have an attorney present at any questioning, and (4) 
that he had the right to have an attorney appointed if the suspect 
was without funds.  While the Court pointed out that these rights 
could be waived, such a waiver would be examined to ensure it 
was made both “knowingly and intelligently.”58  Confusion alone 
does not make the decision to waive the right to remain silent in-
valid.  In Connecticut v. Barrett, the defendant refused to make a 
written statement, but agreed to “talk.”59  He later argued that 
 
 53 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Before Miranda, “compulsion” to testify meant legal com-
pulsion so that the witness faced the potential of perjury or contempt.  Reliance on Fifth 
Amendment application to informal compulsion rejected much precedent but was not con-
trary to constitutional interpretation.  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 437–38 (1987). 
 55 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 56 Id. at 467.  The Court researched police manuals as a source of current police 
practices and concluded that even without violence or police brutality, “custodial interro-
gation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individu-
als.”  Id. at 455. 
 57 Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 436.  Schulhofer divides the holding into three parts: 
(1) that informal pressure to speak can equal compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, (2) 
that compulsion exists in any custodial interrogation, and (3) that warnings are necessary 
to “dispel the compelling pressure of custodial interrogation.”  Id.  He finds the most con-
troversial part of the holding to be the third step, but he believes that the central part of 
the decision lies within the other parts of the holding.  Id. 
 58 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  The Court later weakened these rights by allowing pre-
warning statements to be used for impeachment purposes only, not as substantive evi-
dence.  See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).  Some view Miranda as a compro-
mise between the “totality of the circumstances” analysis and a complete annihilation of 
confessions, as it combined the impact of both the custody and the interrogation on the 
suspect to determine coercion.  Yale Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man, and the Play-
ers, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1074, 1077 (1984) (reviewing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW 
AND POLITICS (1983)). 
 59 479 U.S. 523, 525 (1987). 
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this showed that he was confused about the consequences.  The 
Court, however, held that the oral statement was admissible.60  
Likewise, in Colorado v. Spring, the defendant agreed to talk 
about one crime.61  In the course of the interrogation, the ques-
tioning shifted to another crime and he made incriminating 
statements.  The defendant said that he did not know what he 
was waiving, but the Court held that these statements were ad-
missible.62 
The Miranda Court did not claim to have discovered some-
thing new in the Constitution that had been overlooked for 180 
years.  Nor did the Miranda Court state that these warnings 
were constitutionally required.63  Rather, Chief Justice Earl War-
ren wrote that the warnings were “safeguards” of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.64  To ensure 
that an accused person is not coerced into incriminating himself, 
he “must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and 
the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”65  The Court 
immediately added that the suggested words were not intended 
to be a “constitutional straitjacket,” and encouraged Congress 
and states to be creative about other ways to protect the rights of 
suspects.66  The Court did, however, demand that any other 
methods be at least as effective as the Miranda warnings.67 
The exact constitutional status of the Miranda warnings be-
came a matter of dispute.  In Michigan v. Tucker, Justice 
Rehnquist wrote that the Miranda warnings “were not them-
selves rights protected by the Constitution . . . .”68  In Oregon v. 
Elstad, Justice O’Connor explained that “errors . . . made by law 
enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda 
procedures . . . should not breed the same irremediable conse-
quences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.”69  
 
 60 Id. at 530.   
 61 479 U.S. 564, 566–68 (1987).   
 62 Id. at 577. 
 63 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 64 Id. at 444. 
 65 Id. at 467. 
 66 Id.  But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000) (finding 18 
U.S.C. § 3501 to be unconstitutional). 
       67 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  Of course, Miranda’s effectiveness is subject to serious 
debate.  See infra note 86 and accompanying text.  For an interesting proposal to expand 
the Miranda warnings to include, among other things, a reminder of the benefits of a 
truthful statement, even if it is incriminating, see Milhizer, supra note 30, at 99–100.  
“True and heartfelt confessions of guilt can likewise be greatly beneficial to the common 
good.”  Id. at 5. 
 68 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).  Rather, the Court noted that the 
warnings were “measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination 
was protected.”  Id. at 444. 
 69 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).  The Court held that “fruit” of a non-coercive Miranda 
violation, at least when the fruit is a subsequent confession, need not be suppressed.  Id. at 
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On the other hand, according to Miranda, both federal and state 
law enforcement officials had to give the warnings.70  Since the 
Supreme Court did not have the power to create rules of evidence 
for the states unless that power came from constitutional inter-
pretation, many argued that the Court must have found the 
warnings to be required by the Constitution.  This issue would 
not be resolved until 2000.71 
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO MIRANDA 
Within two years of the Miranda decision, Congress tried to 
change things back.  It seemed clear that Miranda was intended 
to discourage suspects from confessing to the police,72 and it was 
likely that this would have an adverse impact on criminal prose-
cutions and ultimately on the crime rate.  So, taking heed of Jus-
tice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion that the “social costs of 
crime are too great to call the new rules [enunciated in Miranda] 
anything but a hazardous experimentation,”73 Congress enacted 
18 U.S.C. § 3501, which stated, “In any criminal prosecution 
brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a 
confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible 
in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”74  Section 3501 was passed 
 
304. 
 70 See 384 U.S. at 498–99. 
 71 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442. 
 72 Milhizer, supra note 30, at 21 (“The only plausible explanation for the Court’s hy-
perbolic advice is that it wanted the Miranda warnings to discourage suspects from con-
fessing to police.”). 
 73 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 74 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).  
  § 3501. Admissibility of confessions 
 (a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District 
of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissi-
ble in evidence if it is voluntarily given.  Before such confession is received in 
evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any 
issue as to voluntariness.  If the trial judge determines that the confession was 
voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall 
permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and 
shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it 
deserves under all the circumstances. 
 (b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into 
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, 
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defen-
dant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraign-
ment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he 
was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, 
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not re-
quired to make any statement and that any such statement could be used 
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to ques-
tioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such de-
fendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giv-
ing such confession. 
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as part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 and required 
only that a confession be offered voluntarily in order for it to be 
used in court, thereby bypassing Miranda-related legal and evi-
dentiary requirements. 
Congress left no doubt that the purpose of § 3501 was to re-
verse Miranda.  The statute provided that, while the trial court 
is deciding whether a confession is voluntary, it should take into 
account all circumstances surrounding the confession (including 
whether Miranda-type warnings were given).75  The absence of 
such warnings, however, would not preclude admissibility of an 
otherwise voluntary confession.76 
Even though the Supreme Court frequently noted that the 
Miranda warnings were not required by the Constitution, that 
they were merely “prophylactic” protections of the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination,77 for 
thirty years the Attorneys General refused to enforce § 3501, be-
lieving that it was unconstitutional.78  Then, in February of 1999, 
 
  The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken 
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of volun-
tariness of the confession. 
 (c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Co-
lumbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, 
while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any 
law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible 
solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or 
other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the 
laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is 
found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be 
given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given 
by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other de-
tention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall 
not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such 
magistrate judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the 
trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the 
distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge or other 
officer. 
 (d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of 
any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person 
without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made 
or gave such confession was not under arrest or other detention. 
 (e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession of guilt 
of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given 
orally or in writing. 
Id. 
 75 Id. § 3501(b)(3). 
 76 Id. § 3501(b)(5). 
 77 See Darmer, supra note 4, at 344. 
 78 In a concurring opinion in Davis v. United States, Justice Scalia wondered why, 
“with limited exceptions [§ 3501] has been studiously avoided by every Administration, 
not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since its enactment more than 25 years 
ago.”  512 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).  He indicated that while he re-
served judgment, it “seems” that the act’s voluntariness consideration, not  Miranda, is 
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a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit ruled in United States v. Dickerson that the Miranda 
warning no longer governed the admissibility of confessions in 
federal court.79 
Dickerson involved a bank robber from Maryland who con-
fessed to his part in several heists.80  A lower court suppressed 
the confession on the grounds that it had been given before he 
was read his Miranda rights.81  The Fourth Circuit, however, re-
versed the decision and ruled that § 3501 was the governing au-
thority, despite the fact that the government did not base its ar-
gument on this law.82  The case then went to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
In its 2000 decision in Dickerson v. United States, the Court 
broke with the past and elevated Miranda to constitutional 
status.83  Section 3501 was found to be insufficient to protect the 
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself.84  Miranda 
rights would now be considered part and parcel of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Thus, according to the Dickerson Court, the failure 
to Mirandize a suspect was inherently coercive—no matter how 
well the suspect may have been treated, no matter how much his 
physical comfort had been respected, and no matter how well he 
may already have known his rights.85 
IV. THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA ON CRIME 
Many scholars have attempted to obtain empirical evidence 
regarding confessions and the impact of Miranda, but as pointed 
out by other panelists at this Symposium, the difficulty of gather-
ing and evaluating the evidence has led to inconclusive results.86  
 
the legal standard for the admissibility of confessions.  Id. at 464.  The refusal of prosecu-
tors to argue for the application of § 3501 means that courts might be wasting their time 
looking at a “host of  ‘Miranda’  issues that might be entirely irrelevant under federal 
law.”  Id. at 465.  Further, Justice Scalia said that he would “no longer be open to the ar-
gument that [the Supreme Court] should continue to ignore the commands of § 3501 sim-
ply because the Executive declines to insist that we observe them.”  Id. at 464.  He said he 
looked forward to a time “when a case that comes [under § 3501] is next presented to [the 
Supreme Court].”  Id. at 464. 
 79 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 80 Id. at 671. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 695. 
 83 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 84 Id. at 442. 
 85 See id. at 444; McCarthy, supra note 8 (“Failing to provide Miranda rights is sure 
to be found by many federal judges to be a form of lawless coercive interrogation that fits 
within [the] . . . prohibition against cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment.  This is es-
pecially so given that judges frequently resort to legislative history in construing vague, 
confusing, inexact statutory terms.  Anyone reading the Congressional Record here will 
find that the whole purpose . . . was to make coercive interrogation illegal.”). 
 86 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 291.  See also Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s “Neg-
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Some commentators argue that its costs, in terms of lost convic-
tions, are too great to justify the limited benefits Miranda sup-
plies.87  It has been suggested that thousands of violent criminals 
escape justice each year as a direct result of Miranda.88  As one 
noted critic of Miranda has argued: 
  Evidence of Miranda’s harmful effects is mounting.  For example, 
along with various co-authors, I have developed empirical evidence of 
Miranda’s substantial harm to law enforcement.  In my most recent 
articles, I have analyzed the precipitous drop in crime clearance rates 
that followed immediately on the heels of Miranda and concluded that 
Miranda severely hampered police effectiveness.89 
Other commentators argue that the cost of Miranda is 
minimal and the significant benefits include protection of the in-
nocent.90  Still others have even suggested that the warnings 
themselves, used properly, are actually helpful in obtaining 
statements from suspects.91 
 
ligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 327 (1997).  As one British court noted, the right not to testify elicits “strong but 
unfocused” feelings.  Regina v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, Ex parte Smith, [1993] 
A.C. 1, 30–34 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.) (discussing the right to silence and 
different immunities encompassed by this term). 
 87 See Dennis, supra note 14, at 342–53 (concluding that the criminal justice system 
should apply the privilege in limited contexts and not view it as a human right); David 
Dolinko, Is there a Rationale for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 1063, 1064 (1986) (describing the privilege as a historical relic).  Philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham, one of the earliest critics of the privilege, thought that the innocent would want 
to speak, and therefore the privilege would only protect the guilty.  See BENTHAM, supra 
note 14, at 238; see also Dennis, supra at 342 n.2 (citing Bentham’s views regarding the 
privilege against self-incrimination); WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 48–54 (summarizing 
Bentham’s treatise on privilege). 
 88 Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing The Cops?  A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s  
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1126 (1998).  See also Mil-
hizer, supra note 30, at 53 (noting that Miranda was based on the “Reid Model” of psycho-
logical interrogation, which has since become “widely disfavored within the psychological 
community”). 
 89 Cassell, supra note 24, at 531 (citations omitted). 
[T]he innocent are at risk not only from false confessions, but also from “lost” 
confessions—that is, confessions that police fail to obtain from guilty criminals 
that might help innocent persons who would otherwise come under suspicion 
for committing a crime[ or become a victim of the criminals who did not con-
fess].   
  . . . . 
  . . . [T]here is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miranda has exacerbated the risks to the innocent.  The Miranda decision has 
reduced the number of truthful confessions, while at the same time doing noth-
ing about, and probably even worsening, the false confession problem by divert-
ing the focus of courts away from the substantive truth of confessions to proce-
dural issues about how they were obtained. 
Id. at 525–527 (citation omitted). 
 90 See SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 60–62 (1991) (arguing that the in-
nocent are protected by the right to silence); Dennis, supra note 14, at 348 (describing 
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction as a justification for the privilege).  
 91 See SIMON, supra note 15, at 199. 
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Even if Miranda can be used by interrogators to help obtain 
statements from some suspects (and there is every reason to be-
lieve that the police try to exploit any remaining “loopholes”),92 
the rules are certainly designed to dissuade suspects from mak-
ing uninformed statements.  If the rules are serving their in-
tended purpose, they make life harder for interrogators and 
prosecutors.  Logically, then, they would have the same impact 
on those trying to gain information to assist with the War on Ter-
ror. 
Miranda is essentially an exclusionary rule.93  Statements 
taken in violation of it cannot be used against the defendant in a 
subsequent prosecution, but if the suspect who was interrogated 
is not prosecuted, the exclusionary aspect of Miranda has no ap-
plication.  Moreover, there are many exceptions that negate 
Miranda’s effect in specific cases.94  There is also a certain lack of 
logic in a rule that assumes that any statement taken without 
warnings must have been coerced, but does not presume that 
waivers of the right to remain silent or to have an attorney have 
been coerced.95  As Justice Douglas stated in a pre-Miranda case, 
the “trial of the issue of coercion is seldom helpful,” with police 
officers “usually testify[ing] one way, the accused another.”96  
Miranda does little to change this problem.  It just creates a fact 
question, and the prosecution has the burden of proof to show 
that the suspect understood his or her rights before waiving 
 
 92 See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 93 Traditionally, it has been said that there is no violation until the statement is 
used at trial.  See Darmer, supra note 4, at 345–46 (quoting United States v. Bin Laden, 
132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).  In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 
(2003), however, the Court ruled that whether the suspect’s substantive due process 
rights had been violated and an action could proceed against the interrogator had to be 
addressed on remand, even though the statement was not used at trial.  Id. at 772 (“Our 
views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause do not 
mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally 
permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial; it simply means that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases and provide relief in ap-
propriate circumstances.”). 
 94 See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that un-Mirandized 
confessions may still be used for impeachment purposes); Bowen v. State, 607 So. 2d 1159 
(Miss. 1992) (noting that when a defendant is entitled to Miranda warnings and does not 
receive them, any voluntary statement made by him may be used for impeachment pur-
poses); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing an exception to Miranda 
for questioning prompted by concern for public safety). 
 95 As pointed out by Justice White, “if the defendant may not answer without a 
warning a question such as ‘Where were you last night?’ without having his answer be a 
compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of 
whether he wants to consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?”  
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
 96 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  He 
went on to note that the nature of the process gives defendants “little chance to prove co-
ercion” at trial. 
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them. 
Some commentators even believe that the police have 
learned to work with (or around) the Miranda rules so well that 
they have become nothing more than minor inconveniences or 
perhaps even tools that the authorities can exploit in an interro-
gation.97  Certainly there are some officers who would lie, deny-
 
 97 Consider the following passage: 
  The detective offers a cigarette, not your brand, and begins an uninter-
rupted monologue that wanders back and forth for a half hour more, eventually 
coming to rest in a familiar place: “You have the absolute right to remain si-
lent.” 
  Of course you do.  You’re a criminal.  Criminals always have the right to 
remain silent.  At least once in your miserable life, you spent an hour in front 
of a television set, listening to this book-’em-Danno routine.  You think Joe Fri-
day was lying to you? . . . Get it straight: A police detective, a man who gets 
paid government money to put you in prison, is explaining your absolute right 
to shut up before you say something stupid. 
  “Anything you say or write may be used against you in a court of law.” 
  . . . . You’re now being told that talking to a police detective in an interro-
gation room can only hurt you.  If it could help you, they would probably be 
pretty quick to say that, wouldn’t they?  They’d stand up and say you have the 
right not to worry because what you say or write in this godforsaken cubicle is 
gonna be used to your benefit in a court of law.  No, your best bet is to shut up.  
Shut up now. 
  “You have the right to talk with a lawyer at any time—before any question-
ing, before answering any questions, or during any questions.” 
  Talk about helpful.  Now the man who wants to arrest you for violating the 
peace and dignity of the state is saying you can talk to a trained professional, 
an attorney who has read the relevant portions of the Maryland Annotated 
Code or can at least get his hands on some Cliffs Notes.  And let’s face it, pal, 
you just carved up a drunk in a Dundalk Avenue bar, but that don’t make you 
a neurosurgeon.  Take whatever help you can get. 
  “If you want a lawyer and cannot afford to hire one, you will not be asked 
any questions, and the court will be requested to appoint a lawyer for you.” 
  Translation: You’re a derelict.  No charge for derelicts. 
  At this point, if all lobes are working, you ought to have seen enough of 
this Double Jeopardy category to know that it ain’t where you want to be.  How 
about a little something from Criminal Lawyers and Their Clients for $50, 
Alex? 
  Whoa, punk, not so fast. 
  “Before we get started, lemme just get through the paperwork,” says the 
detective, who now produces an Explanation of Rights sheet, BPD Form 69, 
and passes it across the table. 
  “EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS,” declares the top line in bold block letters.  
The detective asks you to fill in your name, address, age, and education, then 
the date and time.  That much accomplished, he asks you to read the next sec-
tion.  It begins, “YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED THAT:” 
  Read number one, the detective says.  Do you understand number one? 
  “You have the absolute right to remain silent.” 
  Yeah, you understand.  We did this already. 
  “Then write your initials next to number one.  Now read number two.” 
  And so forth, until you have initialed each component of the Miranda 
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ing any brutal or coercive conduct that resulted in a statement 
from the suspect.98  Those same officers, however, are likely to 
testify falsely that they gave appropriate Miranda warnings.  
They may also technically comply with Miranda while still put-
ting the suspect through a very traumatic experience.99 
Whatever the effectiveness of Miranda, the release of a 
common criminal may deny justice, but it usually poses a mini-
mal threat to society.  Terrorism changes that equation.  For that 
reason, one must ask whether a criminal procedure rule such as 
Miranda, or—more broadly—the right not to be coerced into self-
incrimination, should even apply in terrorism cases. 
V. IS PROTECTION FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION PROPER IN THE 
TERRORISM CONTEXT? 
In the context of domestic criminal cases, the Miranda warn-
ings operate to protect suspects’ rights and to make interrogators’ 
and prosecutors’ jobs more difficult.  The question is whether the 
same concerns that justify the right not to incriminate oneself in 
domestic criminal cases are applicable when it comes to the in-
vestigation of international terrorism.  The two primary concerns 
are: false testimony brought during interrogation (reliability) and 
the related issue of brutal tactics being used by police authorities 
in order to elicit incriminating statements (torture). 
A.  Reliability 
If suspects are forced to speak, investigators might get bad 
information.100  Consider the case of Brown v. Mississippi, in 
 
warning.  That done, the detective tells you to write your signature on the next 
line, the one just below the sentence that says, “I HAVE READ THE ABOVE 
EXPLANATION OF MY RIGHTS AND FULLY UNDERSTAND IT.” 
  You sign your name and the monologue resumes. 
SIMON, supra note 15, at 193–94.  “As a result, the same law enforcement community that 
once regarded the 1966 Miranda decision as a death blow to criminal investigation has 
now come to see the explanation of rights as a routine part of the process—simply a piece 
of station house furniture, if not a civilizing influence on police work itself.”  Id. at 199. 
 98 “Put bluntly, an officer inclined to take a swing at a suspect surely would not hesi-
tate to ignore the Miranda protections yet then insist on the witness stand that he had 
given the prescribed warnings.”  Darmer, supra note 4, at 341. 
 99 For example, in Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1986), a very skillful 
interrogator, fully compliant with Miranda, verbally dominated a suspect to the point 
that, after confessing, he collapsed in a catatonic state.  The court included the transcript 
of the interrogation in an appendix.  See id. at app. 
 100 See, e.g., PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING 
WITHOUT WAR 109–11 (2003); Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: 
The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2028–29 (2003); 
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 24; Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the In-
nocent Have Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al; Thomas H. Maugh II, Glendale 
Case Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al. 
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which the defendant’s conviction was based solely on a confession 
induced by beatings.101  He had been hanged twice by the local 
deputy and other men—the marks on his neck were still visible 
at trial—then whipped.  When he would not confess, he was re-
leased only to be picked up two days later, whipped again, and 
told that the whippings would continue until he confessed and 
agreed to every detail that the deputy suggested.  The defen-
dant’s story, in fact, changed several times to fit the facts as they 
were explained to him.  The confession was admitted at trial, and 
the jury convicted and sentenced him to death.102  The U.S. Su-
preme Court held that this violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.103  In fact, it called the Mississippi Supreme Court decision 
upholding the conviction a denial of due process in and of itself. 
As illustrated in the Brown case, and totally aside from the 
related concern for the just treatment of citizens, unrestrained 
interrogation may lead to bad information.  That would serve 
neither the purpose of justice in a criminal context, nor would it 
serve governmental forces fighting terror.  Moreover, false con-
fessions and bad information are not elicited only when physical 
abuse is involved.  Mental duress can also lead to false confes-
sions.104  The right not to incriminate oneself helps protect 
against this concern. 
False confessions that have been obtained in criminal cases 
often have been driven by animus based on factors such as race, 
politics, the desire of police authorities to “close” a case, or other 
personal interests.  Such factors could impact a terror-related in-
terrogation, but the risk is significantly lower, due in part to the 
different goal.  In regular criminal investigations, the goal for the 
officer is to make an arrest and get the suspect off the street.  
The evidence will be tested, if ever, at some uncertain date in the 
future, when someone else (the prosecutor) will try to obtain a 
conviction and close the case.  In that circumstance, the state-
ment is valuable to the arresting officer regardless of whether it 
is accurate. 
Interrogators in the terrorism context are seeking informa-
tion, not trying to get a conviction, and time is far more likely to 
be of the essence.  They know that a statement, much less a false 
 
 101 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 102 Id. at 279.   
 103 Id. at 287. 
 104 See Human Rights Watch, U.S.: CIA Whitewashing Torture: Statements by Goss 
Contradict U.S. Law and Practice, PEACE JOURNALISM, Nov. 2005, 
http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=6948.  An American citizen taken 
into Czech custody on charges of espionage while working as bureau chief for the Associ-
ated Press in Prague signed a false confession after being interrogated for six days.  He 
had been kept awake for over forty-two straight hours. 
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statement, will not close their case.  Interrogation may, however, 
help them thwart a serious threat to peace.  Importantly, inter-
rogators seem to think that pressure—physical or non-physical—
is more beneficial than not.105  They are in the best position to 
evaluate the risk of bad information from aggressive interroga-
tion.  They know the risks of false statements, and yet—in every 
society—they continually return to forceful methods of interroga-
tion.106  Those who are outside of that community are not close 
enough to the matter to successfully prove that the risk of false 
statements is sufficiently serious so as to justify providing terror-
ist suspects with the right not to incriminate themselves.107  Ac-
cordingly, and without intending in any way to condone overly-
aggressive interrogation, much less torture, this “potentially bad 
information” argument is an insufficient justification for the 
right not to incriminate oneself, at least in a terrorist-related 
situation.  It certainly does not justify applying the Miranda rule 
in this context. 
 
 105 Levinson, supra note 100, at 2029–31. 
 106 Id.  See also infra notes 112–126 and accompanying text. 
 107 In fact, scholars have been debating the empirical evidence ever since Miranda 
was announced.  See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 24, at 527–29. 
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B.  Morality and Torture 
A related argument in support of the privilege against self-
incrimination is that without it, interrogators might be tempted 
to coerce suspects into making statements, and they could slide 
into overly-aggressive interrogation or even torture.108  At times, 
of course, they would have an innocent person in custody.  This is 
an ancient concern.  St. Augustine wrote of it in the fifth century: 
  [The accused] is tortured to discover whether he is guilty, so that, 
though innocent, he suffers most undoubted punishment for crime 
that is still doubtful; not because it is proved that he committed it, but 
because it is not ascertained that he did not commit it.  Thus the igno-
rance of the judge frequently involves an innocent person in suffer-
ing . . . [T]he result of this lamentable ignorance is that this very per-
son, whom he tortured that he might not condemn him if innocent, is 
condemned to death both tortured and innocent.  For if he has cho-
sen . . . to quit this life rather than endure any longer such tortures, 
he declares that he has committed the crime which in fact he has not 
 
 108 For an analysis of slippery slope arguments and how they function, see Frederick 
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms 
of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).   
In the Eighteenth Century, Saint Alphonsus Liguori in his Theologia Moralis, considered 
three questions: 
(a) Under what conditions can a judge proceed to have an accused person tor-
tured . . . ?  Answer: the judge may only “descend to torture” as a last resort, 
i.e., when full proof cannot be obtained by non-violent means; next, there must 
already be “semi-complete proof” (semiplenam probationem) of the accused’s 
guilt arising from other evidence; and finally, certain classes of persons are to 
be exempt from torture, either because of their frailty or their great value to 
society: “men of great dignity[,”] knights of equestrian orders, royal officials, 
soldiers, doctors [probably in the general sense of learned men] and their chil-
dren, pre-pubescent children, senile old folks, pregnant women, and those who 
are still weak after childbirth. 
(b) To what extent may the accused be tortured . . . ?  Answer: the more con-
vincing the already-existing evidence for his guilt, the more severely he may be 
tortured, but—taking into account the varying estimated endurance-levels [sic] 
of different individuals—never so severely that “it is morally impossible for 
him to endure” the pain.  If that level of cruelty is in fact reached, “the confes-
sion thus extorted will be involuntary and so must be considered legally null 
and void[,”] even if the accused, for fear of further torment, subsequently rati-
fies his confession outside the torture chamber in the presence of the judge. 
(c) Whether one who has already been tortured may be tortured again . . . ?  
Answer: not if he refuses to confess during the first torture session (unless new 
independent evidence against him subsequently comes to light).  In that case 
he must be set free.  But if he confesses under torture, and then retracts that 
confession before the judge, he may be tortured again—and even a third time if 
the same thing happens after the second torture session.  But if he confesses 
under torture a third time, and yet again subsequently retracts in the presence 
of the judge, he must be released.  For the judge then must presume that his 
three confessions were all forced and involuntary—and therefore invalid. 
Brian W. Harrison, Torture and Corporal Punishment as a Problem in Catholic Theology, 
LIVING TRADITION, Sept. 2005, at pt. II A11, http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt119.html (citing 
Theologia Moralis 4:3:3 nos. 202–04) (third alteration in original) (formatting altered). 
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committed [and] has been condemned and put to death . . . .109 
Overly-aggressive interrogation may be a particularly serious 
threat in the terrorism context.110 
When it comes to criminal investigations, many authorities 
have concluded that the harsh practices associated with “the 
third degree” are less effective in obtaining truthful statements 
than psychologically-oriented techniques designed to reduce the 
suspect’s resistance in the typical criminal investigation.111  In 
terror-related situations, however, the evidence suggests that the 
less aggressive interrogation tactics tend not to be as success-
ful.112  Military interrogators are certainly using tactics that are 
far more aggressive than would be acceptable in common crimi-
nal cases.  Indeed, the events of September 11 have caused seri-
ous scholars to debate the previously unthinkable prospect of le-
galized torture.113 
 
 109 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 19:6 (Marcus Dods trans., Random House, Inc. 
1950) (426). 
 110 Of course, the first issue is to reach a consensus on the meaning of “torture.”  The 
practice lacks a clear definition in international agreements and in American law.  As 
Richard Posner, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at the 
University of Chicago Law School, has noted, “Almost all official interrogation is coercive, 
yet not all coercive interrogation would be called ‘torture’ by any competent user of the 
English language, so that what is involved in using the word is picking out the point 
along a continuum at which the observer’s queasiness turns to revulsion.”  Richard A. 
Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 291, 291 (San-
ford Levinson ed., 2004).  In other words, there is a continuum of pressure that can be 
used during interrogation ranging from an uncomfortable chair and warm lights to ex-
treme physical abuse (and perhaps even worse).  Posner has written, “only the most doc-
trinaire civil libertarians (not that there aren’t plenty of them) deny [that] if the stakes 
are high enough, torture is permissible.”  Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28, 30 (reviewing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM 
WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002)).  More-
over, Posner has written that “[n]o one who doubts that this is the case should be in a po-
sition of responsibility.”  Id. 
 111 See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 24, at 434 n.10 (“Interrogators may have become 
more effective at obtaining confession statements than they were in the prior era of third 
degree interrogation.”). 
 112 YOO, supra note 6, at 189. 
 113 See, e.g., TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 110; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and 
Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); An-
thony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4; Dershowitz: 
Torture Could Be Justified, CNN.COM/LAW CENTER, Mar. 4, 2003, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/ (discussing the possibility with 
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz).  Dershowitz has proposed “torture warrants” in 
cases of “ticking time bomb terrorists.”  ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 141 (2002).  See also Alan 
M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at B19; 
Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture?  Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19.  
Dershowitz would restrict warrants to only the most egregious cases.  See, e.g., Alan M. 
Dershowitz, Letter to the Editor, ‘Torture Warrants,’ S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2002, at B4 
(“My personal hope is that no torture warrant would ever be issued, because the criteria 
for obtaining one would be so limited and rigorous.”). 
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It is worth noting that the United States is not the only na-
tion to reconsider its interrogation regulations in light of modern 
terrorism.  In Israel, for instance, “interrogators used third-
degree practices on alleged Palestinian terrorists, some of whom 
died in custody.  The Supreme Court of Israel recently outlawed 
these practices, but left open the possibility that torture could be 
justified in ‘ticking bomb’ situations.”114 
Similarly, in the early 1970s, “the British and Irish govern-
ments . . . found it necessary to reduce the strength of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the name of fighting terror-
ism.”115  They “introduced security measures that . . . , inter alia, 
allow[ed] courts to draw inferences from a defendant’s refusal to 
answer questions regarding his membership in a terrorist 
group.”116  They “justified laws allowing courts to draw adverse 
inferences from an accused’s silence and other derogations of the 
right to silence by pointing out the sophistication of the IRA and 
other para-military groups in their ability to resist question-
ing . . . .”117 
One reason why the right to refuse to testify is so important 
is because if defendants can be forced to testify, they will—at 
least sometimes—be intimidated into making false confessions.  
The concern over the use of torture to obtain confessions is well-
embedded in American history.  The 1788 debate in the Virginia 
Convention on the ratification of the Constitution contains this 
interesting discussion on the topic: 
  Patrick Henry: . . . . 
  . . . . 
  But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in pref-
erence to that of the common law.  They may introduce the practice of 
France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of 
the crime.  They will say that they might as well draw examples from 
those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there 
is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they 
must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order 
to punish with still more relentless severity.  We are then lost and un-
done. 
 
 114 John Parry & Welsh White, Interrogating a Suspected Terrorist, JURIST LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCE (2001), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism/terrorismparry.htm. 
 115 Stacey Carrara Friends, Note, An Effective Way to Deal with Terrorism? Britain 
and Ireland Restrict the Right to Silence, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 227, 249 (1999). 
 116 Id. at 227 (citing Home News: Commons Special Debate, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 3, 
1998).  “In December 1998, however, Parliament changed the law slightly in light of the 
European Court of Human Rights ruling . . . .”  Id. at 227 n.2 (citing Steve Doughty, 
Judges Force Retreat over Right to Silence, THE DAILY MAIL, Dec. 2, 1998, at 2).  “Courts 
may now only draw inferences from the silence of an accused person that occurs in the 
presence of the accused’s lawyer.”  Id.   
 117 Id. at 250. 
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  Mr. NICHOLAS: . . . But the gentleman says that, by this Constitu-
tion, they have power to make laws to define crimes and prescribe 
punishments; and that, consequently, we are not free from tor-
ture. . . . If we had no security against torture but our declaration of 
rights, we might be tortured to-morrow; for it has been repeatedly in-
fringed and disregarded. 
  Mr. GEORGE MASON replied that the worthy gentleman was mis-
taken in his assertion that the bill of rights did not prohibit torture; 
for that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence 
against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in 
those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the 
criminal himself.  Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no 
cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture 
was included in the prohibition. 
  Mr. NICHOLAS acknowledged the bill of rights to contain that pro-
hibition, and that the gentleman was right with respect to the practice 
of extorting confession from the criminal in those countries where tor-
ture is used; but still he saw no security arising from the bill of rights 
as separate from the Constitution, for that it had been frequently vio-
lated with impunity.118 
This concern about torture applied to both criminal activity 
and warfare.  During the Revolutionary War, General George 
Washington and leaders of the Continental Congress considered 
the just treatment of enemy combatants to be an important stra-
tegic concern.119  As Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. has noted, the Ameri-
can concern for just treatment of prisoners “was all the more ex-
traordinary because these courtesies were not reciprocated by 
King George’s armies.  Indeed, the British conducted a deliberate 
campaign of atrocities against American soldiers and civil-
ians. . . . Captured Americans were tortured, starved and cruelly 
maltreated aboard prison ships.”120  Kennedy went on to note: 
President Lincoln instituted the first formal code of conduct for the 
humane treatment of prisoners of war in 1863.  Lincoln’s order for-
bade any form of torture or cruelty, and it became the model for the 
1929 Geneva Convention.  Dwight Eisenhower made a point to guar-
antee exemplary treatment to German POWs in World War II, and 
Gen. Douglas McArthur ordered application of the Geneva Convention 
during the Korean War, even though the U.S. was not yet a signatory.  
In the Vietnam War, the United States extended the convention’s pro-
tection to Viet Cong prisoners even though the law did not technically 
require it.121 
 
 118 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 377 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
 119 Robert F. Kennedy Jr., America’s Anti-Torture Tradition, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2005, at B21. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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Despite the concern about extorting confessions, governmen-
tal authorities used some very aggressive tactics in trying to ob-
tain confessions well into the twentieth century. 
In 1929, for instance, the Correctional Association of New 
York  
researched the court records and found “strong grounds for suspecting 
that severe practices are employed to obtain information from those 
who come into the hands of the police.”  Among the abusive methods 
in use throughout the United States at that time were solitary con-
finement, whipping by rubber hose, forcing a suspect to look at a de-
ceased victim in the morgue, placing a skeleton in a suspect’s cell, and 
handcuffing the suspect to a chair for thirty-seven hours.122   
  The Association lamented the fact that while “some States have 
passed statutes against [the third degree] there seem to have been 
practically no convictions under them.”  The Association also observed 
that “there is no practical redress for the individual . . . though the of-
ficers are civilly liable to the injured party for mistreating him, this 
remedy is in practice of no avail.”123 
At a very fundamental level, the concern over interrogation 
slipping into torture is a moral decision, not a pragmatic one.124  
American history and American values condemn torture of pris-
oners.  It does not follow, however, that moral concerns would 
justify the same rules in a terror-related scenario that apply in 
common criminal law cases.  In the terror context, when time is 
likely to be of the essence and many lives may hang in the bal-
ance, some form of aggressive interrogation, beyond what is ac-
ceptable when considering common criminals, may be justifiable, 
if not necessary.  The threat is greater, the risk is higher, and the 
time element may be significantly different.125 
 
 122 Ilan K. Reich, A CITIZEN CRUSADE FOR PRISON REFORM: THE HISTORY OF THE 
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK 45 (1994) (quoting PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y., 
NINETY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1943)). 
 123 Id. at 46 (quoting PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y., ONE HUNDRED THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 40 
(1947)) (alterations in original). 
 124 There are those who argue that the law should not impose moral values.  Without 
delving into that argument in other contexts, it is certainly legitimate for a society to de-
cide that authorities who are acting on behalf of the public should behave in a moral 
manner.  Cf. Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 599, 
609–10 (2000) (discussing whether there should be a moral obligation placed on the civil 
government to help the disabled); Rychlak, supra note 50, at 94–97 (advocating for the 
pro-life community to vote into the Senate those with similar moral stances on abortion in 
order to change current abortion law and ultimately change the composition of the Su-
preme Court). 
 125 See generally David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1425 (2005); Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (2004). 
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At the same time, few, if any, citizens want to give interroga-
tors full discretion to do whatever they wish.126  Elimination of all 
rules and the threat of sanctions for the interrogators would open 
the possibility of widespread abuse.  Waterboarding has already 
been publicly defended.127  What about beatings, amputations, or 
inflicting pain on members of the suspect’s family?  As Richard 
John Neuhaus has stated: 
How do we address these questions of what in fact is happening in cir-
cumstances in which conscientious Christians seek moral guidance, 
and how can we do this without falling into the pits of relativism, pro-
portionalism, consequentialism, and related errors?  In the ticking 
bomb instance, does the duty to protect thousands of innocents over-
ride the duty not to torture?128 
Therefore, it is incumbent on modern lawmakers to find a way to 
control interrogations and see that they do not turn into torture 
sessions while permitting interrogators to extract critical infor-
mation.129 
 
 126 Amnesty International’s webpage states: “The America We Believe In Does Not 
Torture People.”  Amnesty International USA, The America We Believe In Leads the 
World on Human Rights, http://believe.amnestyusa.org/site/c.igLQIUOCKtF/b.2070843/ 
k.BDE5/Home.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).  That view is certainly shared by many 
Americans who do not agree with other aspects of the Amnesty International agenda.  
Most religious groups also condemn torture.  See, e.g., Adelle M. Banks, Religious and 
Civil-Rights Coalition Asks Bush to Condemn Use of Torture, PRESBYTERIAN NEWS 
SERVICE, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.pcusa.org/pcnews/2005/05609.htm. 
 127 See Demetri Sevastopulo, Cheney Endorses Simulating Drowning, MSNBC, Oct. 
26, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15433467/.  See also Harrison, supra note 12, at 
24 (stating that waterboarding “causes a brief, panic-inducing sensation of being about to 
drown but no pain or injury”).  On September 20, 2006, television host Bill O’Reilly had 
Brian Ross of ABC News on his show.  Deborah, Bill O’Reilly Endorses Waterboarding As 
Safe and Reliable, NEWS HOUNDS, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.newshounds.us/2006/09/20/ 
bill_oreilly_endorses_waterboarding_as_safe_and_reliable.php.  Ross stated that “14 de-
tainees with very important information about future terror plots broke down and talked 
after [being subject to] waterboarding.”  Id.  He reported that “the toughest suspect broke 
down in [two and a half] minutes,” but most detainees “only lasted for 30 seconds.”  Id.  
Ross “admitted that it probably could kill someone,” but the main thing about water-
boarding is that it makes the subject feel like he is drowning because it triggers “an un-
controllable gag reflex.”  Id.   
 128 Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square: Secularization Doesn’t Just Happen, 
FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2005, at 58, 62, available at http://www.firstthings.com/ 
article.php3?id_article=164. 
 129 There are at least four different reasons why an interrogator might resort to tor-
ture: (1) for the illegal enjoyment of the person inflicting the torture; (2) to extract a con-
fession of criminal activity; (3) to punish an enemy or wrongdoer; or (4) to obtain informa-
tion so as to prevent greater harm (the “ticking bomb” scenario).  See Harrison, supra note 
12, at 26.  The concerns that relate to criminal law rules primarily address the first three 
reasons.  The torture scenario most often invoked when discussing terrorism, however, is 
the fourth reason.  See id. at 26–27.  That is why the typical criminal law analysis does 
not perfectly fit in the ticking bomb scenario.  The moral equation is different.  According 
to Father Brian Harrison, a professor at the Pontifical University of Puerto Rico, the 
Catholic Church has condemned the first three reasons for inflicting torture, but—
perhaps tellingly—has not expressly condemned torture in the fourth situation.  Id. 
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In light of these moral concerns, not to mention the interna-
tional conventions, stripping all regulation from interrogation is 
simply not a viable alternative.  If the controls were completely 
lifted, it is easy to imagine interrogators going too far.  Therefore, 
some controls must apply in these situations.130 
VI.  APPROPRIATE CONTROLS ON TERROR-RELATED 
INTERROGATIONS 
Recognizing that there is reason to place restrictions on in-
terrogation, even in the terrorism scenario, the next question be-
comes whether Miranda-style protections should be given to the 
suspects.  The answer here must be “no.”  Miranda is not a good 
way to regulate terror interrogations.  As Justice O’Connor ex-
plained in a 1993 case, “Because Miranda ‘sweeps more broadly 
than the Fifth Amendment itself,’ it excludes some confessions 
even though the Constitution would not.”131  Perhaps that is why 
one Congressman said: “There’s not a single member of this Con-
gress that believes that Miranda warnings should be given to 
terrorists . . . .”132 
Whatever the cost may be in the criminal context, terrorism 
shifts the balance of this equation.  The risk of a single criminal 
going free is relatively small.  Large terror-related organizations 
are a different matter.  “[T]he harm any individual ordinary 
criminal can inflict, if wrongly freed, is limited.  The potential 
harm an al Qaeda operative can inflict is potentially enor-
mous.”133  Criminal laws have long been written so as to recog-
nize the additional danger associated with joint or group activity, 
 
 130 The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides: 
Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish 
the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the 
person and for human dignity.  Except when performed for strictly therapeutic 
medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations 
performed on innocent persons are against the moral law. 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2297 (1994).  The Catechism goes on to state: 
In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments 
to maintain law and order . . . . In recent times it has become evident that 
these cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity 
with the legitimate rights of the human person.  On the contrary, these prac-
tices led to ones even more degrading.  It is necessary to work for their aboli-
tion.  We must pray for the victims and their tormentors. 
Id. at ¶ 2298. 
 131 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)). 
 132 Rep. Hunter Sides with Bush Administration on Military Tribunals, 
FOXNEWS.COM, July 12, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,203126,00.html 
(quoting Rep. G.K. Butterfield). 
 133 YOO, supra note 6, at 201. 
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and the danger presented by international terror organizations 
must similarly be recognized by the law. 
In a criminal investigation, if police questioning is prompted 
by an immediate concern for public safety, the Supreme Court 
has held that the officers may question the suspect without first 
providing Miranda warnings.134  Moreover, the suspect’s answers 
to these questions may be used not only to avert the immediate 
threat but also as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution 
against the suspect.135  This does not mean, of course, that any 
and all tactics are legitimate when an officer is motivated by pub-
lic safety concerns.136  Limits still have to be set to protect sus-
pects from overly aggressive interrogation.  For today’s purposes, 
however, the key is that Miranda is not the way to protect those 
suspects. 
In the terrorist situation, it would seem that every interroga-
tion—at least every one that is hypothesized when discussing the 
ticking bomb scenario—can be said to be prompted by a concern 
for the public safety.  This does not mean that every tactic can be 
justified in the terror-related scenario.  If aggressive interroga-
tions take place, there will be mistakes in determining who is a 
legitimate suspect, and there will be times when techniques used 
to obtain information will not be justified.  In those cases, gov-
ernmental officials should face an inquiry and be able to defend 
their actions.  Should they be unable to justify their actions, they 
would be subject to possible punishment.137  If police are allowed 
to use otherwise impermissible interrogation tactics when lives 
are at stake, how far should they be permitted to go?138 
 
 134 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also Darmer, supra note 4, at 342–
43. 
 135 Quarles, 467 U.S. at  659–60. 
 136 Id. at 656, 658 (stating that when officers ask questions, they need to be “reasona-
bly prompted by a concern for the public safety”) (emphasis added).  A coerced, involun-
tary statement, for instance, would not be admissible under this Miranda exception.  Ore-
gon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985). 
 137 Two issues that require further development include: (1) where responsibility 
should be attached, and (2) whether low-ranking officials who are ordered to carry out ag-
gressive interrogations should be able to invoke the “Nuremberg defense” of superior or-
ders.  Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 340 
(2002); Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protest-
ers, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 413 (1989) (“[I was only] following superior orders . . . .”). 
 138 The answer to this question could have the long-term consequence of adversely 
impacting the treatment of U.S. citizens who are held in other nations.  As such, this is a 
problem that calls for resolution.  The rules of procedure and evidence for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) provide for the protection of certain self-incriminating testi-
mony.  See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Criminal Court add. 1, pt. I, ch. 4 R. 74(3),  U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 2000).  Perhaps more importantly, the ICC may have ju-
risdiction over those who commit torture in certain circumstances.  See Neil A. Lewis, 
Military’s Opposition to Harsh Interrogation is Outlined, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at 
A21; John M. Czarnetzky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the In-
663-692 RYCHLAK.DOC 9/18/2007 7:02:25 AM 
690 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:663 
After-the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial investigations give 
governmental authorities flexibility to deal with interrogation 
problems that are impossible to foresee but likely to develop.  
This approach strikes a balance between the two competing 
needs (information to combat terrorism and just treatment of all 
detainees) and succeeds where Miranda fails because it holds in-
terrogators responsible if they “cross the line” but does not stop 
the flow of information.  This approach is not perfect; it will not 
stop all overly-abusive tactics.  The same, of course, can be said 
of Miranda and almost every other device ever used to protect 
against abusive interrogation. 
Unlike Miranda, this approach requires that the analysis 
and evaluation of the interrogation occur after the interrogation 
has taken place.139  In the terrorism/ticking bomb scenario, this 
approach is reasonable due to the immediate nature of the threat 
because the issues are complex, and various factors are likely to 
shift from one case to the next.  It is not possible to develop in 
advance a one-size-fits-all template to determine what level of 
pressure can or should be applied to a given suspect and a par-
ticular threat.140  With after-the-fact hearings, however, various 
principles and limitations designed to protect detainees from 
overly-abusive tactics (and to let government authorities know 
what is permissible) can and should be established.  It can be as-
sumed that they will evolve over the years. 
CONCLUSION 
Protection from forced self-incrimination is an important 
value in our criminal law system, and Miranda is one way to en-
force that right.  Due to the increased threat and time pressures, 
the analysis shifts in the terrorism/ticking bomb scenario.  There 
are still reasons to provide some level of protection against forced 
self-incrimination to terrorist suspects, primarily to prevent in-
terrogators from becoming overly abusive.  The justifiable level of 
pressure to be applied in any given terror-related case, however, 
cannot be decided with certainty in advance.  Too many factors 
have to be taken into consideration.141  While there must be limi-
 
ternational Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55 (2003). 
 139 “Judges are good at focusing on what has happened in the past.  Whether an at-
tack might occur in the future, its magnitude, and how to stop it is beyond their usual ex-
pertise.” YOO, supra note 6, at 201.  When it comes to terrorism, the same might be said of 
legislators and regulators. 
 140 See Darmer, supra note 4, at 371 (“Beyond limiting the use of physical force to ex-
tract confessions, it is difficult to establish rules, in advance, on the permissible range of 
tactics when seeking confessions.”). 
 141 The most extreme forms of torture (e.g. life-threatening, permanent injury, harm 
to third parties) might well be prohibited in advance.  In other cases, numerous factors 
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tations, Miranda is not the appropriate way to enforce those limi-
tations in the terrorism scenario.  Rather, there must be after-
the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial investigations that can look at 
all the facts and evaluate the actions of the interrogating au-
thorities. 
In the War on Terror, part of the battle is to thwart the en-
emy, part of it is to protect innocent citizens, and part of it is to 
maintain moral standards.  The United States will have to make 
many decisions in future years, and those goals will sometimes 
compete with each other.  We should remember that military and 
quasi-military actions are fundamentally different from criminal 
investigation.  Accordingly, we cannot simply take criminal law 
doctrines and expect them to work in these new situations.  At 
the same time, we have to maintain a basic level of morality in 
how we carry out governmental activities, and that may require 
the development of new standards and procedures.  It may be dif-
ficult to do this, but it is necessary if we are to defeat terrorism 
without compromising our integrity. 
 
must be considered, and that probably forecloses a hard-and-fast rule with broad applica-
tion. 
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